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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
---------------------------------------------------------
LOGA~ CITY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No, 
16320 
ROBERT KELLY BASSETT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Defendant in a criminal misdemeanor case appealed 
from a judgment by the Honorable Zachary T. Champlin, 
Circuit Court Judge, as affirmed by the Honorable VeNoy 
Christoffersen, District Court Judge. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court denied Defendant's appeal from the 
Circuit Court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss a 
charge filed by the City of Logan concerning driving with 
a blood alcohol content of .10% or higher. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that this Court affirm the District 
Court's decision and dismiss appellant's appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with Appellant's Statement of Facts 
and for the convenience of the Court, restates them 
herein: 
By a single Complaint signed Janu&ry 30, 1978, 
the appellant was charged with having committed 
criminal offenses on January 25, 1978 of driving with 
a blood-alcohol content of .10% or higher, driving 
a motor vehicle through a red stop light, and 
being a person under the age of twenty-one years 
in possession of alcoholic beverages. 
The matters were set for trial on April 12, 1978. 
At the start of the trial Count 2 and 3, the red 
light violation and illegal possession of alcohol 
violation respectively, were dismissed on motion of 
Logan City. Then the prospective jurors were sworn 
and voir direct. A jury was selected and sworn to 
try the case. 
Appellant's counsel then moved the Court to dismiss 
Count l, the charge of driving with a blood alcohol 
content of .10% or higher, pursuant to 76-l-402 
and 403, Utah Code Annotated. This motion was 
granted by the Logan City Judge, the Honorable 
Zachary T. Champlin. 
On April 17, 1978, Logan City appealed Judge 
Champlin's decision to the District Court of the 
First Judicial District in and for the County 
of Cache, contending that the City Court erroneously 
interpreted and applied the Single C~iminal Episode 
Statutes, 76-l-402 and 403, Utah Cod~ Annotated. 
The appellant filed a ~otion to dismiss respondent's 
appeal, contending that the Notice of Appeal had 
-2-
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not personally been served upon the appellant or 
his counsel. This Motion was denied by Memorandum 
Decision of Judge VeNoy Christoffersen on June 16, 
1978. 
Appellant then filed a Motion to dismiss the 
Complaint pursuant to the Single Criminal Episode 
Statutes. 
By Memorandum Decision dated August 21, 1978, Judge 
VeNoy Christoffersen denied appellant's Motion to 
dismiss the appeal. 
Immediately after this Memorandum Decision, 
appellant filed a Motion to dismiss the Complaint, 
contending that 77-51-6, Utah Code Annotated, 
constituted a bar to any further prosecution of the 
appellant. 
By Memorandum Decision dated September 19, 1978, 
Judge Christoffersen declined to rule on that issue 
and remanded the matter back to Logan City Court 
which had by this time become the Logan Department 
of the Circuit Court. 
Appellant then filed his Motion to dismiss the 
Complaint in the Logan Department of the Circuit 
Court. It was denied by the Honorable Zachary T. 
Champlin by Memorandum Decision dated November 20, 
1978. 
Appellant filed an appeal to the Cache County 
District Court, still contending that 77-51-6, Utah 
Code Annotated, prohibited further prosecution of 
the offense of driving with a blood-alcohol content 
of .10% or higher. By Memorandum Decision dated 
February 8, 1979, the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen 
denied appellant's motions and appeal. 
ARGmlENT 
DIS).!ISS,"\L OF A CRUliNAL CASE ON ~lOTION OF DEFENDANT WHICH 
WAS RESISTED BY THE CITY AND WHICH DISMISSAL WAS FOUND TO BE 
ERRO~EOUS ON APPEAL BY THE CITY, IS NOT A DISMISSAL PURSUANT 
TO TITLE 77, CHAPTER 51 OF THE UTAH CODE. 
-3-
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On April 12, 1978, Plaintiff was ready to try Defendant 
on three charges: 
1. Driving a motor vehicle through a red stop light, 
2. Being a person under age of twenty-one years 
in possession of alcoholic beverages. 
3. Driving with a blood alcohol content of .10% 
or higher. 
In the presence of Defendant and his attorney, 
Plaintiff City moved to dismiss Counts l and 2 mentioned 
above with no objection from the Defendant (obviously). The 
Court then proceeded to impanel and swear in a jury to try 
Defendant on the remaining charge. Defendant's lawyer 
slyly waited until that had been accomplished and then 
moved the Court to dismiss the remaining count because it 
had suddenly beC(J!TI"' a. "s;Jbsequent prosecution" arising out 
of the same cr'" ~pisode which, he argued, was now 
barred by Sections 76-l-402 and 76-l-403, U.C.A., 1953, 
The trial court accepted the argument, granted defense 
counsel's motion and dismissed the case. The City 
immediately appealed which resulted in a reversal of the 
trial court, and after considerable other legal maneuvering, 
Defense counsel then argued that the case had been dismissed 
pursuant to Chapter 51 of Title 77, Section 4, which 
provided: 
The court may, either of its own motion or 
upon the application of the county attorney, 
-1-
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in furtherance of justice order an action 
information or indictment to be dismissed.' 
The reasons for the dismissal must be set forth 
in an order entered upon the minutes. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The Court is invited to examine all of the sections in 
Chapter 51. It will find that the only dismissals allowed 
by or provided for in the chapter are: 
l. Dismissals on the court's own motion in furtherance 
of justice. 
2. Dismissals on the motion of the county attorney 
in furtherance of justice. 
Section 77-51-6, U.C.A., 1953, provides that if the Court \ 
dismisses on its or the county attorney's motion in furtherance 
of justice, the Defendant cannot again be prosecuted 
for that offense. With that the City agrees. But as the 
District Court stated it, 
'' ..• this was not a dismissal as provided by the 
cited chapter. The dismissal was based entirely 
upon another section of the code in which this Court 
on the first appeal termed to be was erroneous. 
Therefor the dismissal is not a bar to further 
proceedings by the circuit court." 
In Boyer v. Larsen, 433 P.2d 1015 (Ut. 1967), cited 
by Defendant the court dismissed the case, but it is not 
entirely clear who made the motion. Apparently the motion 
was made by the prosecuting attorney because in dealing 
with the issues the court cited a case where the county 
attorney had made the motion. Therefore Defendant cannot 
cite it as authority for a circumstance where Defendant 
made the motion. The real issue addressed by the court 
-5-
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in that case was whether the Defendant had been in jeopardy 
because the dismissal took place before a jury was impaneled, 
The focus was not on whether Defendant or the prosecution 
made the motion or whether Defendant could waive double 
jeopardy protection by his own motion. 
Defendant also cites State v. Lewis, 536 P.2d 738, 
(Id. 1975), but points out the very reason why the case 
does not aid him but rather supports the Logan City view. 
The statute on which the Idaho court relied specifically 
includes motions made by Defense counsel. Utah's statute 
excludes those motions. 
A PARTY WHO PROCURES OR CACSES OR CONSENTS TO AN ERRONEOUS 
DISMISSAL OF A CHARGE AGAI~ST Hift!, CANNOT CLAIM DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY. 
Defendant must take responsibility for the error of 
the trial court when it dismissed the charge against him 
upon his motion and urging. See State v. Shaw, 6 Ariz: 
App. 33, 429 P.2d 667 (1967), where a mistrial was mistakenly 
or erroneously granted upon Defendant's own motion. See 
also State v. Madrid, 113 Ariz. 290, 552 P,2d 451 (1976), 
People v. Hathcock, 504 P.2d 476, 106 Cal. Reporter 
540, 8 Cal., 3rd 599 (1973), and United States v. Tateo, 
377 U.S. 463, 467, 12 L. Ed. 2d 448, 451, 84 S. Ct. 
1587 (1964); 
-6-
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Jeopardy under the circumstances of this case has 
continued through the appeal process and still remains 
until that process ends. Boyer v. Larson, supra. 
Criminal procedural law is designed to set forth a 
procedure which is orderly and fair to the litigants 
before the court. However, because defendants everywhere 
have continually resorted to it in an attempt to avoid 
a trial based on the merits, and with considerable success, 
the need of the people of a state or city to be treated 
with procedural fairness when attempting to enforce their 
laws and ordinances, sometimes gains little attention. 
It is hoped that in reviewing this matter the Court will 
recognize that need as being very real. 
CO:-ICLUSION 
It affords no comfort and makes little sense to tell 
a city it has a right to bring violators to justice and 
to prosecute for offenses committed, but if a trial court 
commits error at the urging of the Defendant and the City 
corrects that error by a successful appeal, it nevertheless 
cannot bring the violator to face the charge even though 
the City committed no error and did everything it co.uld 
to prevent it. Such a result can hardly be said to be 
procedurally fair to a city and the people it represents. 
-7-
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The ri~ht to appeal under those circumstances is hardly 
a rigb~ a~ all. Plaintiff urges the Court to affirm the 
District Court's decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MAILL'l'G CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage prepaid, 
to Brian R. Florence, Attorney for Appellant, 818-26th 
Street, Ogden, Utah, S140l, and two copies to Robert B. 
Hansen, Utah SL·.t·. :\t<ul'rdc:y General, 236 State Capitol 
Buildi~g, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this _;L-- day of 
~.lay, 1979. 
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